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Abstract This paper provides an overview of the UK
market for energy service contracts in 2014 and high-
lights the growing role of intermediaries. Using infor-
mation from secondary literature and interviews, it iden-
tifies the businesses offering energy service contracts,
the sectors and organisations that are purchasing those
contracts, the types of contract that are available, the
areas of market growth and the reasons for that growth.
The paper finds that the UK market is relatively large,
highly diverse, concentrated in particular sectors and
types of site and overwhelmingly focused upon
established technologies with high rates of return. A
major driver is the emergence of procurement frame-
works for energy service contracts in the public sector.
These act as intermediaries between clients and contrac-
tors, thereby lowering transaction costs and facilitating
learning. Themarket is struggling to become established
in commercial offices, largely as a result of split incen-
tives, and is unlikely to develop further in this sector
without different business models, tenancy arrange-
ments and policy initiatives. Overall, the paper con-
cludes that energy service contracts can play an impor-
tant role in the transition to a low-carbon economy,
especially when supported by intermediaries, but their
potential is still limited by high transaction costs.
Keywords ESCOs . Energy performance contracts .
Intermediaries . Procurement frameworks
Introduction
Many commentators argue that the transition to a sus-
tainable, low-carbon economywill require companies to
evolve from selling increasing volumes of products (e.g.
cars, lights, motors) to efficiently delivering final ser-
vices to consumers (e.g. mobility, illumination, motive
power) at lower economic, energy and environmental
costs (Lay et al. 2009; Stahel 1997; Steinberger et al.
2009). For example, rather than simply selling lighting
equipment, companies (or ‘contractors’) may provide
agreed levels of illumination for a client and take re-
sponsibility for the ownership, installation, operation,
maintenance, upgrading, replacement and/or disposal of
the necessary equipment under the terms and conditions
of a long-term contract. Such energy service contracts
may capitalise on the core strengths of the contractor (or
energy service company—ESCO), achieve cost savings
for the client, mobilise low-cost finance and reduce the
energy and emissions required to obtain a given level
and quality of illumination. In contrast to traditional
product sales, this type of contract may incentivise the
contractor tominimise the life-cycle costs of the relevant
equipment, to select the appropriate size and quality of
equipment, to improve energy efficiency and/or to ex-
tend product life. As such, a shift from product sales to
energy service contracts may provide an effective means
of reducing both end use and embodied energy demand.
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Although these expectations are informed by
real-world experience, the UK market for energy
service contracts has not taken off to the extent
that some commentators had hoped (Hansen et al.
2009; Stahel 2006)—suggesting either that the ex-
pectations were overoptimistic, or that important
barriers have yet to be overcome. To explore these
issues further, this paper provides an overview of
the UK market for energy service contracts in
2014 and highlights the growing role of interme-
diaries. It summarises the businesses and partner-
ships offering energy service contracts in the UK
in 2014, the sectors and organisations that are
purchasing those contracts, the types of contract
that are available, the areas of market growth and
some of the reasons for that growth. Put simply,
the paper summarises who is providing what to
whom, on what terms and why.
The paper is based upon information compiled
during 2014–2015 from primary and secondary
literature, a survey of energy service companies
(ESCOs), attendance at conferences and workshops
and semi-structured interviews with 23 sector rep-
resentatives. Documentary sources were identified
from journal databases and web searches and in-
cluded a large proportion of ‘grey literature’.
Interviewees included monitoring and verification
(M&V) experts (2), finance experts (2), ESCO
representatives (5), market analysts (3), procure-
ment framework representatives (4), trade body
representatives (1), procurement experts (2), local
authority representatives (2) and policymakers (2).
Interviews were recorded and transcribed, except
in cases where topics were commercially sensitive.
Since only ten companies responded to the survey,
it was not possible to derive a reliable quantitative
estimate of the size of the UK market in 2014.
Reliable estimates of market size are also not
available from documentary sources. Primary reli-
ance is therefore placed on the interview results.
The paper is structured as follows. The first
section introduces the different types of energy
service contract, followed by a brief history of
energy service contracts in the UK, an overview
of the current market status and a summary of the
drivers and barriers to market growth. The paper
then provides an overview of the companies cur-
rently operating in the UK and their different
business strategies, followed by a review of market
activity in different sectors - paying particular at-
tention to the health sector and local authorities.
The paper concludes by highlighting the enabling
role provided by intermediaries and the limitations
of the contracting model.
Types of energy service contract in the UK
Various definitions of energy service contracting have
been proposed (Vine et al. 1999), but few satisfactorily
describe the diversity of contractual arrangements that
are available or the range of activities involved. Energy
service contracts have been variously defined and
categorised in relation to the nature of the energy ser-
vices covered, the source of finance for new investment,
the ownership of the relevant assets, the provision of
guarantees for savings in energy consumption and/or
costs and the degree to which control of energy services
together with the associated risks is transferred to the
contractor (Lay et al. 2009; Sorrell 2007). But there is
little consensus on which combination of these distin-
guishes energy service contracts from more convention-
al market relationships. Also, the terminology used
varies from one country to another, as does the types
of contract available.
In a conventional ‘design and build’ project, the
contractor is responsible for design, specification,
construction and commissioning, and is paid on
project completion. The contractor may be liable if
the equipment does not work or does not perform to
specification, but the contractor is not involved in
operating the equipment and has neither the incen-
tive nor the means to optimise equipment perfor-
mance subsequent to project delivery. In contrast,
an energy service contract establishes a link between
contract payments and equipment performance and
schedules these payments at intervals over a long-
term period (typically, a minimum of 3 years). This
provides the contractor with a long-term responsi-
bility for ensuring and maintaining equipment per-
formance (payment by results), with much of the
performance risk of the relevant equipment being
transferred to the contractor. The key to energy
service contracts is therefore the performance incen-
tives it provides, with contract payments commonly
being linked to the energy and cost savings
achieved. In addition, such contracts frequently
( though not a lways) inc lude per formance
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guarantees, where the ESCO guarantees to deliver
particular levels of energy or cost savings.
Two types of energy service contracts
As illustrated in Fig. 1, it is useful to distinguish between
& Energy supply contracts (ESCs) that primarily focus
upon the delivery of ‘useful energy streams’ (e.g.
steam, hot water and electricity) at a unit cost
(£/kWh) below an agreed baseline; and
& Energy performance contracts (EPCs) that primari-
ly focus upon the delivery of ‘final energy services’
(e.g. heating, lighting, refrigeration) at an annual
energy cost (£) below an agreed baseline.
Both types of contract deliver energy savings through
improving the efficiency of primary or secondary con-
version equipment such as boilers and lights, preserving
heat, momentum or materials in the associated passive
systems such as buildings, or reducing demand for final
energy services such as illumination (Cullen and
Allwood 2010). EPCs generally provide greater incen-
tives to reduce energy demand than ESCs,1 but the
boundaries between the two are blurred and contracts
vary in the number of energy-related technologies and
services that they cover and the degree to which they
cede control of those technologies and services to the
contractor. A more common term for ESCs in the UK is
contract energy management which typically involves
the delivery of steam or hot water to a medium-sized site
(‘taking over the boiler house’) often in association with
CHP investment. EPCs are more commonly used for
public sector buildings and usually involve the guaran-
tee of energy cost savings, the finance of investment
from those savings and the inclusion of detailed provi-
sions for monitoring and verification. The EU Energy
Efficiency Directive (Council of the European Union
2012) has sought to standardise the definition of EPCs
as follows:
…Energy performance contracting means a con-
tractual arrangement between the beneficiary and
the provider of an energy efficiency improvement
measure, verified and monitored during the whole
term of the contract, where investments…in that
measure are paid for in relation to a contractually
agreed level of energy efficiency improvement or
other agreed energy performance criterion, such as
financial savings… (Council of the European
Union 2012)
Dimensions of an energy service contract
Sorrell (2005; 2007) argues that both ESCs and EPCs
can be classified by the following:
& Scope: the number of useful energy streams and/or
final energy services that are wholly or partially
under the control of the contractor.
& Depth: the number of organisational activities re-
quired to provide those streams or services that are
under the control of the contractor.
& Finance: the source of funds for new investment.
Scope relates to what technologies and systems are
included in the contract (e.g. boilers, CHP, lighting,
building and controls) while depth relates to how they
are included (e.g. who has responsibility for design and
engineering, financing, equipment specification, pur-
chasing, installation, commissioning, operation, mainte-
nance, monitoring, verification, and energy purchasing).
Taken together, these influence the potential for cost
savings, the distribution of risks and rewards and the
associated transaction costs (Sorrel l 2005).
Comprehensive energy service contracts are broad and
deep, providing the contractor with extensive control of
the majority of useful energy streams and final energy
services on one or a group of sites. However, it is
possible to have contracts that are broad and shallow,
as well as those that are narrow and deep.
The source of finance may include working cap-
ital provided by the client or by the ESCO, loans
from financial institutions and equity from risk in-
vestors. Of particular importance is whether the in-
vestment is primarily financed through debt taken on
by the client and hence appears on the client’s bal-
ance sheet, or whether the investment is financed by
the ESCO (DECC 2014b; Fawkes 2007). The latter
may be unsuitable for small ESCOs since additional
projects increase leverage—unless subcontractors
can take on the debt. With larger projects, the
ESCO may join with providers of risk capital and
possibly the client to form a ‘special purpose
1 If ESCs primarily charge for delivered useful energy, they may
provide little incentive to reduce energy demand.
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vehicle’ (SPV)—where lender security is confined
to the assets of the project, rather than those of the
client or contractor.
Terms of an energy service contract
The terms of an energy service contract can be complex
(Table 1), and until recently, there has been little
standardisation. On the one hand, bespoke contracts
provide diversity and adaptability and can form a core
part of an ESCO’s ‘value proposition’. On the other
hand, such contracts can be time-consuming to negotiate
and establish (e.g. 12 months), require the client to
engage significant legal expertise (‘…lawyers are mak-
ing a fortune on non-standardised contracts…’2) and
increase transaction costs for both parties (typically 5–
10 % of total project cost). This in turn can make
contracting unsuitable for smaller sites that have only
limited scope for energy cost savings. Standardised
contracts offer the potential to reduce transaction costs,
while standardised methods for monitoring and verifi-
cation (notably the International Performance
Measurement and Verification Protocol—IPMVP) can
reassure clients and reduce risk to lenders.
The bidding process for contracts also varies. Clients
may specify targets in terms of energy savings or other
metrics and solicit bids against those targets (target
bidding), or they may enter into a partnership with one
or more ESCO to develop projects before agreeing
targets (partner bidding). The former approach encour-
ages competition and hence value for money, but may
also entail higher costs for the ESCOs and miss more
ambitious opportunities. The latter approach can foster
innovation and trust as well as helping clients to identify
potential savings, but it can also limit competition at an
early stage of the procurement process. This is where
dedicated intermediaries can be useful in helping clients
to identify projects and estimate target savings prior to
going to tender.
History of energy service contracts in the UK
The UK energy service contracting market dates back to
1966, when Associated Heat Services (AHS) (Fawkes
2007) was set up by the National Coal Board to out-
source the management of boiler houses (Fawkes 2007;
Hannon 2012; Iqbal 2009).3 The market grew slowly up
to the early 1980s when it was characterised by a grow-
ing number of companies offering energy supply con-
tracts (‘contract energy management’), primarily to in-
dustrial sites. The market leaders were Emstar, formed
by Shell in 1982, and BP Energy which followed in
1983 (Fawkes 2007). Heat supply contracts allowed
Fig. 1 Energy supply versus
energy performance contracts
2 Interview with finance expert, 2014.
3 In fact, the model dates back to the eighteenth century when
Boulton and Watt used a form of ‘shared savings’ contracts to
commercialise theWatt steam engine in coal mines (Crump 2007).
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engineering companies to diversify their offerings to
include finance and other ‘value-added’ services and
thereby grow their market share. Over time, these con-
tracts became more sophisticated and extended to a
wider range of utilities (e.g. cooling, industrial gases,
water), and they continue to dominate the UK market
today (Fawkes 2007; Marino et al. 2010).
The EPC business model was imported from the
US in the 1980s, with the Utility Management
Company being the first to offer EPCs (Fawkes
2007). These took some time to become established,
partly because the cheap sources of public finance that
drove the US market were largely absent in the UK.
But a number of developments, including changed
regulations on the use of external financing by local
authorities (Fawkes 2007; Grout 1997; Sorrell 2005),
began to open up the UK public sector. The 1980s also
saw some consolidation in the UK market, with AHS
merging with Emstar in 1989 and subsequently being
taken over by Dalkia (a subsidiary of Veolia
Environnement) (Fawkes 2007; Iqbal 2009).
Market growth in the 1990s was partly driven by the
diffusion of CHP and partly by the increasing tendency
for organisations to outsource non-core services. The
latter was particularly important for IT, but an increasing
range of energy services were affected by this trend. The
1990s also saw the growth of ‘facilities management’
(FM) contracts that encompassed a range of activities
such as security, fire safety, maintenance and cleaning,
but rarely extended to energy services. Declining energy
prices in the 1990s reduced interest in energy efficiency,
thereby negatively affecting energy service contracts,
but the ongoing liberalisation of gas and electricity
markets created new opportunities for ESCOs to engage
in energy purchasing.
In the early 2000s the market changed again.
Revisions to the electricity trading arrangements nega-
tively impacted the market for small-scale generation
and hence that for energy supply contracts (Hannon
2012). On the other hand, gas and electricity prices
rapidly increased after 2003,4 improving the economics
of energy efficiency and strengthening the incentive for
clients to outsource energy services. These incentives
were enhanced by an increasing range of policies aimed
at improving energy efficiency and reducing carbon
emissions, such as the Climate Change Levy and the
Climate Change Agreements (Ekins 2010).
Table 1 Issues covered by the terms of an energy service contract
Area Issues
New equipment Specification, selection, cost, responsibility for installation and commissioning
Equipment ownership Rights during and after contract, buyback provisions
Maintenance Division of responsibilities, monitoring
Operation Division of responsibilities, monitoring, coordination
Performance and quality standards May range from pressure and temperature in the case of steam supply to complex
mix of comfort standards in the case of building energy services (e.g. temperature,
lighting levels, air exchange, user control)
Reliability standards Maximum downtime, provisions for immediate and backup service in the event
of malfunction
Service standards Acceptable parameters for temperature, lighting, air exchange and other factors
Monitoring and verification Methods for monitoring and verifying energy provision, consumption and savings,
including the use of standardised protocols
Calculation of cost savings Baseline energy consumption and operating conditions, assumptions, formulae,
adjustment protocols
Pricing and payment provisions Fixed and variable components of pricing, guarantees to client, division of savings
Adjustment to external changes Adjustment to inflation, changes in energy prices and other factors
Provisions for early termination Buyout provisions, compensation, equipment removal provisions, restoration of facility
Other Insurance, dispute resolution, penalties for contract breach, force majeure, etc.
Source: Based on Hansen and Weisman (1998)
4 Between 2004 and 2011, UK non-domestic electricity prices rose
by around 115 %, and non-domestic gas prices rose by around
95 %, compared with general price inflation of 22 %.
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The 2008 global economic crisis put a halt to market
expansion as lending criteria tightened and levels of
investment fell dramatically (Marino et al. 2010). But
the market began to recover after 2012, particularly in
the public sector.
Drivers and barriers to energy service contracts
in the UK
Our interviewees consistently reported that the UK
market had grown modestly since 2012 and that
this growth was continuing through to the end of
2014. The majority also observed that the fastest
growing market was in the public sector, and the
primary reason for this was the introduction of
public procurement frameworks (PPF)—such as
the Carbon and Energy Fund (CEF) in the health
service and the RE:FIT initiative in London. These
frameworks act as specialised intermediaries be-
tween client and ESCOs, assisting clients in the
process of contract negotiation as well as
employing standardised templates for contracts
and invitations to tender and bundling multiple
sites within a single contract (Bleyl et al. 2013).
By such means, the frameworks lower transaction
costs, reduce procurement times (e.g. to 3 to
6 months) and extend the contracting model to
smaller sites such as primary schools.
Slower market growth was reported in the
commercial and industrial sectors, but definitional
problems and the reluctance of contractors to
reveal relevant information make it very difficult
to estimate the overall market size. Marino et al.
(2010) estimated a UK ESC market of £350
million/year in 2009, and an EPC market of £55
million/year—and our interviews strongly suggest
that the market has grown since that date. Fawkes
(2007) provides an earlier estimate of £500–750
million for both types of contract, but much de-
pends on which activities are included. While
ESCs typically involve larger capital investments,
the market for EPCs is growing more rapidly. The
market in the UK is larger than in most European
countries (Bertoldi et al. 2014; Marino et al.
2010), but that is partly due to the relative size
of the UK economy. Comparison between coun-
tries is difficult, however, because the size of the
market in different countries has not been estimat-
ed on a consistent basis.5
Interviewees highlighted a number of drivers of mar-
ket growth, but found it difficult to assess their relative
importance. On the ‘market’ side, the drivers mentioned
most often by interviewees were (a) increasing compe-
tition and diversification within the energy service mar-
ket, including the emergence of independent ESCOs; (b)
growing interest from utility companies in the energy
service business model—partly as a response to slow
demand growth, changing regulations and a rapidly
shifting electricity supply mix (Chazan 2014;
Energyspectrum 2014); (c) rising energy prices encour-
aging greater management attention to energy efficien-
cy; and (d) easier availability of low-cost finance for
energy efficiency investment (for example from Salix
Finance,6 London Energy Efficiency Fund and
Sustainable Development Capital LLP).
‘Policy’ drivers appeared less important than market
drivers, but several interviewees highlighted the incen-
tives for both low-carbon energy supply (e.g. feed-in
tariffs and renewable heat incentive) and demand re-
sponse (e.g. the UK capacity market) which had encour-
aged ESCOs to extend their range of activities (DECC
2014a).7 Interviewees also highlighted the increased
availability of public finance for low-carbon investment,
such as from the UK government’s Green Investment
Bank and various EU initiatives.
Other drivers mentioned include organisational inno-
vations and the growing use of performance-based busi-
ness models by equipment and capital goods manufac-
turers (Philips 2014); the inclusion of energy services
and performance incentives within broader facility man-
agement contracts; and the greater breadth and increased
stringency of climate policy, including new initiatives
such as the Carbon Reduction Commitment.
Interviewees also identified numerous barriers to ener-
gy service contracts, many of which have been highlight-
ed by earlier studies (Bertoldi et al. 2014; Garnier 2013b;
Sorrell 2005, 2007). These are summarised in boxes 3 and
5 Bertoldi et al. (2014) and Marino et al. (2010)) provide over-
views of the market within each EU Member State, but these are
based upon national-level assessments that use different defini-
tions and measures of energy service contracts.
6 Salix is a not-for-profit company with funding from the UK
government providing interest-free loans to the public sector to
improve energy efficiency and reduce carbon emissions.
7 The combination of demand reduction, demand response and
distributed generation is now termed ‘D3’ by the UK government
(DECC 2014a).
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4. However, the relative importance of these barriers
varies between sectors and has changed over time. For
example, pervasive split incentives provide the biggest
obstacle to contracting within the commercial office sec-
tor, but are much less important within the public sector.
In contrast, business risk appears the dominant concern in
industry. Awareness of the nature and benefits of
contracting appears to have substantially increased over
the last decade, while concerns about job losses and
contractual risks appear less prominent and low-cost fi-
nancing is more readily available. Few of our interviewees
identified financing as a major obstacle:
…if you have a viable business plan with robust
M&V, you should not have any trouble accessing
finance…8
Box 1: Incentives for organisations considering en-
ergy service contracts
• We need to save money: Aim to reduce energy costs and
capture additional benefits such as reduced labour and
maintenance costs, improved comfort and improved worker
productivity.
• We need to focus: Prefer to concentrate attention on core
competences and to outsource non-core activities.
• We need new kit: Need to replace or upgrade key items of
energy-related equipment, owing to the age of plant, deteri-
oration of efficiency, poor reliability and other concerns.
• We need finance: Aim to invest in new equipment while
avoiding additional debt.
•We need to reduce risk: Aim to offload equipment performance
and other risks to parties that are better able to manage them.
•We need better skills: Aim to access expertise and skills that are
not available in-house, perhaps as a consequence of
downsizing or of the retirement of key personnel.
• We need to comply: Aim to comply with health, safety and
environmental regulations, but are challenged by their
increasing complexity and stringency.
• We need to be green: Aim to demonstrate visible
improvements in environmental performance and carbon
emissions—especially for larger organisations that are
subject to policy incentives or sensitive to investor and
consumer pressure.
Source: Stakeholder interviews conducted during
2014–2015 and Sorrell (2005).
Box 2: Obstacles to organisations considering energy
service contracts
Information
•We have not heard of it: Lack of awareness of the existence of
contracting and the opportunities it offers.
• We do not understand it: Insufficient understanding of what
contracting involves.
• We are efficient already: Lack of awareness of the
opportunities for reducing energy costs.
• We think there is a catch: Distrust of the ‘something for
nothing’ nature of contracting.
•We do not know our own costs: Inadequate energy monitoring
and cost accounting, making it difficult to assess
opportunities, draw up invitations to tender and appraise
contractual offers.
• We have heard that ESCOs rip you off: Reports of bad
experience with energy service contracting, creating a bias
against it even when those reports have little foundation.
Split incentives
• We will not get the savings: Split of responsibility for energy
costs between individuals, departments or organisations (e.g.
landlord-tenant) reducing the financial incentive for
contracting.
Risk
• We do not want to commit: Uncertainty over long-term
business prospects leading to reluctance to enter into long-
term contracts.
• We do not want to lose control: Concern about equipment
reliability and production continuity leading to a preference
for in-house control and a distrust of contractual guarantees.
• We can do it better: Preference for in-house energy manage-
ment, even when current performance is poor and financing
problematic.
Transaction costs relative to energy cost savings
• We have other priorities: Management focus on strategic
priorities leading to neglect of energy saving opportunities
(‘…either I use my money to buy a new cancer ward with
more beds, or I reduce our energy bills…’a).
• We are not interested: Small share of energy in total costs
encouraging neglect of energy saving opportunities (‘…
energy bills represent less than 3 % ofmy budget. If I want to
save money, I sack people…’b).
•We do not have the time and skills: Lack of management time
and specialised knowledge preventing the investigation and
negotiation of contracts—despite the potential of such
contracts to free-up staff time over the longer term.
aInterview with procurement framework representa-
tive, 2015.
bInterview with procurement framework representa-
tive, 2015.
Source: Stakeholder interviews conducted during
2014–2015 and Sorrell (2005).
Providers of energy service contracts in the UK
Our interviews and documentary searches indicate that
there were at least 50 companies and cooperatives of-
fering energy service contracts in the UK in 20148 Interview with an ESCO representative, 2015.
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(Table 2). At least 35 ESCOs had a national or interna-
tional focus, of which 15–20 were relatively active, 5–
10 were ‘large players’, 25 offered EPCs in some form
and 22 were participating in the public procurement
frameworks. In addition, there were at least six commu-
nity ESCOs and at least nine local authority ESCOs
engaged in supplying energy in their local areas
(Hannon et al. 2015). The overall picture was one of
fluidity, with regular changes in the number and owner-
ship of companies, and diversity, with considerable var-
iation in the origin, expertise and size of companies, and
in the types of contract offered, sectors targeted, tech-
nologies installed and savings achieved. The largest
contractors were subsidiaries of multinationals such as
Dalkia and Honeywell, but the last few years had seen
the emergence of smaller and more specialised ESCOs
such as ANESCO. Utilities such as EdF and EON were
becoming more important players, despite energy ser-
vice contracts forming only a small part of their overall
business, while local authorities were entering the ener-
gy service market as providers, although their activities
were primarily focused upon heat and electricity supply
(Hannon et al. 2015).
With such a diversity of companies and activities, the
boundaries of the ‘sector’ are unclear and there is no
single trade association. In 2014, ten of the companies
listed in Table 2 were members of the Association for
Decentralised Energy (formerly the CHPA), seven were
members of the Alliance for Energy Management
(AfEM), ten were members of the Energy Systems
Trade Association (ESTA) and several were not affiliat-
ed to any association. Since none of these trade associ-
ations focus solely upon energy service contracting,
they may not provide an effective lobby in its favour.
Equipment suppliers
Some of the biggest market players are subsidiaries of
international equipment suppliers, such as Honeywell
and Johnson Controls, and have sufficient scale to pro-
vide their own financing. Suppliers of primary conver-
sion equipment (e.g. Veolia) offer energy supply con-
tracts focused upon CHP, suppliers of secondary con-
version equipment (e.g. Philips) offer specialised ‘pay as
you ‘save contracts for technologies such as lighting
(Philips 2014) and suppliers of building energy man-
agement systems (e.g. Johnson Controls) offer bespoke
performance contracts using a range of technologies.
But diversification is the norm and companies are in-
creasingly combining these approaches. For example, it
is common for building control providers to install more
efficient boilers and CHP while companies specialising
in CHP are moving into building controls.
Utilities
Subsidiaries of energy utilities see the energy service
market as a way of diversifying their business and
Table 2 Companies providing
energy supply and energy perfor-
mance contracts in the UK in
2014
Origin Main companies
Equipment suppliers Doosan Babcock, Finning, General Electric, Honeywell,
Johnson Controls, Philips Lighting, Siemens, Veolia (Dalkia)
Utilities EDF, E.On, British Gas Business, SSE
Construction/engineering
companies
Bilfinger, Bouygues, Imtech, Interserve, Kier, Skanska,
Willmott Dixon
Facilities management/
integrated services
Carillion, Cofely, ENER-G, Mitie, Norland, Schneider Electric
Procurement agency EuroSite Power, Utilitywise
Independent ESCOs Ameresco, Anesco, Breathe Energy, Cynergin, Self Energy,
Utilyx, Vital Energi
Local authority Aberdeen Heat and Power Company, Barkantine Heat and Power
Company, Birmingham District Energy Company, Coventry
District Energy Company, Enviroenergy, Leicester District
Energy Company, Pimlico District Heating, Southampton
Geothermal Heating Company, Thameswey Energy
Community Brighton and Hove Energy Services, Douglas Community
EcoHeat, Kielder Community Enterprises, Meadowside Ozone
Energy Services, Ovesco, Woolhope Woodheat
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adding value to their core markets. Their level of in-
volvement varies widely, with British Gas being one of
the most successful and with several utilities actively
participating in the public procurement frameworks
(Table 4). But the provision of energy services presents
a different business challenge to energy supply and
requires new competencies and skills, so entering this
market can be challenging. One response is to buy up
specialised energy efficiency companies, but several
interviewees questioned whether utilities fully under-
stood the complexity involved:
…My view is that [utilities] know they have to do
something but they don’t know what to do and
they don’t really understand it because, at the end
of the day, […] they are run by people who un-
derstand energy supply but don’t understand en-
ergy efficiency. I think they understand [the need
to change], but it’s like steering a super-tanker.9
Facilities management companies and independent
ESCOs
Facilities management companies such as Cofely (GDF
Suez) and MITIE are increasingly active in the energy
services area, building upon their extensive experience
with outsourcing more generally—particularly in the
USA (Goldman et al. 2005; Larsen et al. 2012a, b).
Such companies have the capacity to cover a wide range
of contracts and may have different divisions targeting
different markets.
Independent ESCOs are typically smaller and newer
and tend to intermediate between technology providers,
maintenance contractors, legal firms, financiers and oth-
er organisations (DECC 2014b; Garnier 2013a). Much
of the engineering work is subcontracted to specialist
companies who guarantee equipment performance and
sometimes also provide financing. The ‘risk boundary’
differs between contracts and some ESCOs may out-
source nearly every step of the process to other compa-
nies—thereby minimising their risk exposure. Their
business model relies upon cooperation with established
technology providers with a proven track record and a
solid credit rating since ‘…they are the only ones that
can give a guarantee that’s worth it…’10
Local authorities and community ESCOs
Local authorities are increasingly engaged in energy
projects, with a proportion of these involving the provi-
sion of district heating through energy supply contracts
(Hannon et al. 2015; Nolden and Sorrell 2015). The two
main business models for local authorities are: first, to
establish an arm’s-length, not-for-profit ESCO that is
owned and operated by the local authority; and second,
to collaborate with an existing ESCO to establish a
special purpose vehicle. Notable examples of the former
include Aberdeen Heat and Power (Aberdeen City
Council) and Thameswey Energy (Woking Borough
Council), while notable examples of the latter include
Birmingham District Energy Company Ltd (Cofely
GDF Suez) (Hannon et al. 2015; Hawkey et al. 2013).
Local authorities may also act as sponsors for various
types of community ESCO, but the majority of these are
primarily engaged in small-scale renewable energy sup-
ply rather than energy efficiency.
Overall, this review demonstrates that there is no
single market for energy service contracts in the UK
and no unified set of market actors. Instead, it is more
useful to subdivide the market into particular segments,
such as the market for energy performance contracts in
public sector buildings. Each market segment appears
relatively competitive, with no single dominant players.
Markets for energy service contracts in the UK
The contracts offered by UK companies vary widely in
size: for example, from a capital investment of around
£50 thousand for sites bundled into a multisite contract,
up to £25 million or more for large-scale CHP and heat
distribution. While traditional energy supply contracts
dominate overall investment, the number of perfor-
mance contracts is growing, the boundaries between
supply and performance contracts are becoming less
clear (many contracts include both) and an increasing
number of contracts incorporate renewable energy.
Our interviews indicate that most companies would
not consider individual clients with a minimum annual
utility bill of less than £500 thousand, although the
smaller, independent ESCOs have a lower threshold
for contract size. Energy supply contracts are more
common in industrial sites and in non-domestic sites
suitable for CHP (e.g. hospitals), while energy perfor-
mance contracts are more common in non-domestic
9 Interview with finance expert, 2015.
10 Interview with finance expert, 2015.
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buildings. The latter typically focus upon well-
established, low-risk technologies such as lighting (es-
pecially LEDs), HVAC, voltage optimisation and build-
ing controls and tend to use low-cost measures with
short paybacks to subsidise more capital intensive mea-
sures with longer paybacks. EPCs rarely extend to
building envelope measures and are not driving the
‘deep retrofits’ of buildings—partly because there are
so many low-cost energy-saving opportunities still
available, but also because EPCs appear less suitable
for measures with low rates of return. Contract lengths
vary from a minimum of 3 years to a maximum of
25 years, although most are between 5 and 10 years.
Energy savings are typically between 10 and 30 % of
baseline and typically involve capital investments of
£0.5–5 million.
Industrial markets
Industrial contracts primarily focus upon heat sup-
ply and on-site electricity generation through CHP.
As well as delivering useful energy at a specified
unit cost, these contracts must meet high standards
of reliability, since interruptions in energy supply
can damage or stall industrial processes and have a
major impact on profitability. Contracts that ‘take
over the energy centre’ may also provide industrial
gases, cooling and water but rarely extend to in-
dustrial processes—both because the contractor has
less expertise than the clients with these technolo-
gies and because the clients usually wish to retain
control over their core activities. Performance con-
tracts are less common in industry, although some
ESCOs provide guaranteed savings for specific
services such as compressed air, warehouse light-
ing or voltage optimisation. The continuing decline
in UK industrial capacity constrains market growth
in this sector, and the potential for energy savings
is typically less than in public and commercial
buildings:
…What we’re seeing within the manufacturing
sector is that a lot of the low-hanging fruit, the
things you would typically look for when you
step on-site for the first time have already been
done. They’re looking for more innovative
technologies such as waste-to-energy, on-site
generation, modern control systems, anything
like that that would give them an additional
5–10 % saving on top of what they have
already achieved…11
Many of the industrial sites targeted by ESCOs are of
intermediate size with moderate energy intensity. This is
because large, energy-intensive sites tend to have suffi-
cient in-house expertise to exploit cost saving opportu-
nities, while smaller, less energy-intensive sites may
miss those opportunities but the potential savings are
too small to make contracting viable (Sorrell 2005). As a
consequence, SMEs remain largely untapped to date,
although some ESCOs are beginning to enter this mar-
ket through energy purchasing. By procuring energy for
several similar SMEs, it is possible to guarantee lower
energy bills through bulk purchasing. Once a trusted
relationship has been established, further demand reduc-
tion services may be included in the energy service
package.
Commercial sector markets
While there are numerous examples of ESCs in the UK
commercial sector, the take-up of EPCs is much lower
than in the public sector. This parallels the situation in
the USA, where industry and commerce account for
only 15 % of the US EPC market and commercial
offices only 6% (Larsen et al. 2012a, b). The UKmarket
includes small-scale CHP contracts in hotels and leisure
facilities, larger supply contracts in airports and data
centres that also extend to lighting, ventilation and other
services, and an increasing number of contracts in pri-
vate schools that encompass both energy supply and
energy demand. The combination of ageing infrastruc-
ture, access to finance and a desire to appear ‘green’ has
made private schools a growth market. Contracts in all
areas increasingly include solar PV and biomass, and
use the revenue derived from feed-in tariffs and the
renewable heat incentive to cross-subsidise investments
in energy efficiency.
Despite the size of the relevant estate, there are rela-
tively few contracts in the retail sector—largely because
retailers have large and sophisticated energy manage-
ment teams that manage multiple sites, and because they
are reluctant to cede control over critical equipment such
as refrigeration. The largest potential market is commer-
cial office space, but here, the barriers to energy service
contracts appear particularly large. Commercial
11 Interview with trade association representative, 2015.
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companies have a higher credit risk than the public
sector and shorter time horizons, which make them
reluctant to sign contracts of more than 5 years duration.
But a greater problem is that the majority of office space
is leased, creating the well-known problem of split
incentives (Sorrell et al. 2004). Landlords are reluctant
to invest since tenants will reap the benefits in terms of
lower energy bills, energy-efficient buildings do not
attract a significant rental premium (despite the use of
Energy Performance Certificates) and tenants lack the
ability and/or incentive to invest since their tenure may
be relatively short. This leads to widespread scepticism
of the potential for EPCs in this sector:
…You can’t do any EPC in commercial office
space. It doesn’t work… EPC works in a certain
market segment and that is primarily the public
sector. It doesn’t work in any other market seg-
ment. In the US when they tried to take into
another segment it failed miserably…12
Several interviewees highlighted the potential of al-
ternative policy initiatives and business models to over-
come these barriers—as summarised in box 3. These
ideas draw upon recent experience in the USA and
Australia (Dixon et al. 2008; Fawkes 2013; Kim et al.
2012; Sayce et al. 2009; Supple 2010) and were consid-
ered by one interviewee to represent: ‘…a huge
flowering of innovation and change that will completely
eclipse the EPC market in time….’13 However, the UK
has yet to develop an equivalent of PACE or MEETS;
green leases have attracted only limited interest (Dixon
et al. 2014), and a policy initiative based upon on-bill
financing (the ‘Green Deal’) was not a success
(Rosenow and Eyre 2015; Rosenow and Sagar 2015).
More generally, energy efficiency improvements in the
commercial and other sectors are hindered by the diffi-
culty financiers have in recognising energy cost savings
as security for loans:
…Energy efficiency projects do not yet meet the
requirements of capital markets. The industry is
too disaggregated. No two projects or contracts
are alike. Securitisation is not practical or possible
under these circumstances. Say you have 1000
energy efficiency projects. Standard and Poor
would have to read 1000 documents to assess the
risk. Fees won’t pay for that level of review…14
This problem has led to the establishment of a
European Investor Confidence Project (ICP) which
seeks to standardise how energy efficiency projects are
engineered, documented, evaluated and implemented
through the development of standardised protocols and
crediting processes. The aim is to certify projects as
‘investor ready’, thereby reducing transaction costs, im-
proving confidence in reliability of energy savings and
allowing investors to package investments for trade in
secondary markets. As with the initiatives in box 3, the
ICP has yet to become established in the UK. But some
combination of these different approaches is likely to be
required in the commercial office market, since the EPC
model alone will not unlock the potential.
Box 3: Emerging models for energy efficiency in-
vestment in the commercial office sector
On-bill finance (OBF): More of a collection mechanism than a
type of financing, with the repayment of capital (from
utilities, the state or third parties) taken from electricity and
gas bills. The total post-retrofit utility bill should not exceed
the pre-retrofit bill, and repayment obligations are tied to the
property and not the owner. This mechanism has proved
successful in the USA, but the UK Green Deal
policy—which was modelled on the US experience—proved
unsuccessful and was withdrawn in 2015.
Property Assessed Clean Energy financing (PACE): Ameans of
financing building renovations through the use of bonds
offered by local governments to investors. The funds raised
are used to finance energy efficiency investments that are
then repaid via annual assessments on property taxes. The
loan is secured to the building and not to the owner or tenant.
Green leases: Leases that give the landlord and tenant
responsibilities with regard to the sustainable operation of a
property—for example, energy efficiency measures, waste
reduction/management and water efficiency. ‘Darker green’
provisions include energy efficiency targets with penalties for
non-compliance, such as increased rents or rent reductions.
Measured Energy Efficiency Transaction Structure (MEETS):
Developed by Energy RM and used in Seattle, this relies
upon a ‘dynamic’metering system that provides estimates of
energy savings that have been approved by the local utility.
The client pays an agreed price per unit saved (MWh) on a
20-year agreement similar to a power purchase agreement.
Repayment is linked to the building rather than the occupier.
12 Interview with finance expert, 2015.
13 Interview with finance expert, 2015.
14 Michael Eckhart Managing Director and Global Head of
Finance and Sustainability. Quoted in http://www.greenbiz.com/
article/can-new-standard-spur-new-investment-green-buildings
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Source: Dixon et al. (2008); Fawkes (2013); Kim
et al. (2012); Sayce et al. (2009); Supple (2010);
Stakeholder interviews 2014–2015
Public sector markets
In most countries, the public sector provides the largest
market for energy service contracts, owing to its large
and diverse estate (e.g. hospitals, offices, schools, librar-
ies, leisure centres), low credit risk, long time horizons,
security of tenure, targets to improve energy perfor-
mance and, in some cases, access to low-cost financing.
The UK public sector market has taken longer to devel-
op than in the USA and many European countries
(Bertoldi et al. 2014; Garnier 2013b; Goldman et al.
2005; Larsen et al. 2012a, b), but the recent introduction
of public procurement frameworks (PPF) for energy
service contracts has significantly increased activity.
These frameworks are the most important development
in the UK market in the last ten years.
Framework agreements are a common feature of UK
public sector procurement and set out the terms and
conditions under which purchases or contracts (‘call-
offs’) can be made throughout the period of the agree-
ment (typically 4 years). The agreement is advertised in
the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU), but
the individual call-offs are not—thereby avoiding the
associated time delays and costs. The new PPF involve
a standardised process for developing energy service
contracts that comply with EU regulations and allows a
number of pre-qualified ESCOs to bid. The PPF also
establish intermediary organisations to facilitate the
contracting process and use standardised templates and
contracts. There are five frameworks currently in opera-
tion: two developed by local authorities (RE:FIT and P-
EPC) and three developed for the National Health
Service (NHS) (CEF, Essentia and Ecovate)—although
each are being extended beyond their core sectors.
Table 3 summarises these frameworks while Table 4
indicates the companies participating within each. Their
importance is reflected by the number of contracts that
they have established in a short space of time, the grow-
ing interest in their approach by a range of public sector
organisations the development of model contracts and
guidance notes by the UK government that are based
upon those used by RE:FIT (DECC 2015a, b).
Procurement of an energy service contract typically
requires significant time, resources, know-how and ex-
pertise on behalf of the client. These may not be readily
available, or may be expensive to acquire, with the pro-
curement process being further complicated by the need
to coordinate departments with competing interests. The
intermediaries established by the PPF can reduce these
problems by assisting clients in feasibility studies, struc-
turing finance, preparing tender documents, evaluating
proposals, providing monitoring and verification and so
on. At the same time, the intermediaries can help con-
tractors to better understand client needs and assist in
mediating conflicts (Bleyl et al. 2013; Mourik et al.
2014).
As an illustration, the Programme Delivery Unit
(PDU) set up by the RE:FIT framework helps clients to
benchmark their energy consumption, identify invest-
ment options, estimate potential energy and carbon sav-
ings, develop project briefs and conduct competitions to
select their preferred contractor. It significantly lowers
transaction costs for the client by providing expert assis-
tance along with templates for each project stage, and
encourages learning by providing case studies and facil-
itating access to previous RE:FIT participants to share
knowledge.15 Such a process allows clients to benefit
from the experience of previous projects, as well as
streamlining the procurement process and minimising
conflicts (Bleyl et al. 2013; Mourik et al. 2014). And
since the intermediary is independent of the contractors,
cost-effectiveness is increased. The CEF operates in a
similar way:
…Traditionally public sector bodies would com-
plete stand-alone procurement so contracts had to
be purchased, consultants employed and contrac-
tors procured, and once it was complete all the
knowledge was lost. Then, after construction, the
schemes typically started to underperform due to a
lack of finance, contractual awareness and knowl-
edge if things didn’t go as well as expected. The
CEF was created as a place to capture knowledge
and to simplify the process so could be repeated
time and time again…16
Up to 2015, RE:FIT clients paid no cost for this
facilitation process, thanks to subsidies from the local
authority and the EU ELENA scheme,17 while clients
15 RE:FIT website (http://refit.org.uk/).
16 CEF website (http://www.carbonandenergyfund.net/)
17 Run by the European Investment Bank, the European Local
Energy Assistance (ELENA) scheme covers up to 90 % of the
technical support costs needed to prepare, implement and finance
regional sustainable energy projects.
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of other PFEPCs pay around 4 % of the capital value of
the projects. All of the PPF appear increasingly success-
ful, but they differ in their focus, scale and method of
approach (Table 3). To illustrate, we summarise the two
largest—CEF and RE:FIT.
The Carbon and Energy Fund (CEF) is the oldest and
largest framework in the UK and primarily operates in the
health service—which has an annual energy bill of more
than £750 million across 12,000 sites (2300 hospitals),
ageing infrastructure and significant backlog maintenance
(GIB 2014). The CEF funds, facilitates, manages and
monitors complex energy infrastructure upgrades for large
sites, including hospitals and, more recently, universities.
The CEF combines the roles of framework agreement,
intermediary and financier, since it is also an SPV with
funding from the Green Investment Bank and other
sources.Most CEF projects involve large scale CHP, boiler
replacement, building management systems and some de-
mand side investment, with a minimum project size of £1
million and typical size £6 million. On average, 4–6 of its
16 pre-approved suppliers bid for individual projects,
guaranteeing either unit price or energy cost savings of
20%ormore over periods of 15–25 years. The framework
has completed or is processing more than 40 projects
amounting to over £200 million in capital value and
expects to double that figure over the next few years.
RE:FIT was launched by the Greater London
Authority (GLA) in 2008 and is now being extended
throughout the UK public sector. The scheme was partly
modelled on US experience, including the retrofit of the
Empire State Building (GLA 2012). The framework
uses EPCs with guaranteed savings and has a target of
retrofitting 40 % of London’s public sector floor space
by 2025 (GLA 2015). There are 12 approved contrac-
tors, of which 4–6 typically bid for a project. The
average project involves capital investment of £1 mil-
lion and delivers 15–20 % energy savings with a pay-
back period of 5–7 years—primarily using established,
low-risk technologies. In contrast to CEF, most RE:FIT
projects are financed by clients taking on low-cost loans.
The use of standardised contracts and involvement of
the PDU can shorten the contracting process to as little
as 8 weeks. Over 50 contracts had been signed up to
summer 2015, involving 200 public sector bodies (e.g.
local and central government, NHS, museums, schools)
and over 400 buildings, and these are expected to reduce
carbon emissions by 30 kt CO2/year from an investment
of £63 million (GLA 2012, 2015). A notable feature of
Table 3 Key features of UK public procurement frameworks for energy services
Originator RE:FIT P-EPC CEF Essentia Ecovate
Greater London
Authority
Peterborough City
Council
Countess of Chester
Hospital NHS
Foundation Trust
Guy’s and St Thomas’
NHS Foundation Trust
King’s College
Hospital NHS
Foundation Trust
Established 2008 2013 2011 2012 2013
Approved
contractors
12 1 16 8 8
Main clients Public sector
organisations in
London (2008) and
England (2014)
Local authority
premises
NHS trusts and
universities
NHS trusts and public
sector organisations
NHS trusts
Achievements 200 public sector
organisations in
London with over
460 buildings.
£68.6 million of
investment with
typical savings of
15–20 % (up to
47 %) and payback
of 5–7 years
First two phases with
ten buildings in total
completed with
£4.4 million
investment. Phases
3–5 include 42
schools. Guaranteed
energy savings of
20 %with a 15-year
payback
50 NHS hospitals to
date. Target of
upgrading 240 over
16 years. Current
contracts amount to
£100 million in
capital value, £20
million in savings
and over 20 % in
energy savings (up
to 50 %) with 15–
25-year payback
14 NHS Trusts have
established EPCs
using the framework
with typical energy
savings of 15–25 %
and average energy
saving of 17 %
Kings College NHS
Trust has established
an EPC-reducing
energy consumption
by 9 % with
11 years payback,
removing £3.1
million of backlog
investment
Note: Figures apply to early 2015, but the market for each framework is growing rapidly.
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RE:FIT is the extension of the approach to schools via
bundled, multisite contracts with a target of retrofitting
over 200 schools in 3 years.
Overall, the procurement frameworks have catalysed
the UKmarket for energy performance contracts and are
expected to drive energy savings in the UK public sector
for a number of years. The frameworks are similar to
those emerging in other EU countries (e.g. Austria,
Germany, Sweden) and demonstrate the importance of
such intermediaries for enabling clients to access energy
service contracts (Bleyl et al. 2013).
Conclusions
This article has summarised the status of the UKmarket
for energy service contracts in 2014. There are three
main conclusions. First, the UK market is large by
European standards, experiencing modest growth, high-
ly diverse, concentrated in particular sectors and types of
site, and primarily focused upon established technolo-
gies with high rates of return. While energy supply
contracts account for the larger share of investment,
the market is increasingly shifting towards energy per-
formance contracts. This market is proving successful in
overcoming barriers to energy efficiency investment and
is delivering significant cost savings to multiple clients.
However, the range of clients is restricted, innovative
technical solutions are largely absent and critical areas
such as building fabric improvements remain largely
untouched.
Second, the most important driver of market growth
is the development of procurement frameworks for en-
ergy service contracts in the public sector. By acting as
intermediaries between clients and contractors, these
frameworks lower transaction costs, facilitate learning
and are beginning to extend the contracting model to
smaller sites. Previous literature has paid little attention
to the role of intermediaries in this market, but the UK
experience suggests that their role in the public sector is
critical and deserves further investigation.
Third, the EPC model is struggling to become
established in the commercial sector in general and the
commercial office sector in particular, partly as a result
of split incentives. To unlock this market, different
business models, tenancy arrangements and/or policy
initiatives are likely to be required—perhaps modelled
upon recent developments in the USA and Australia
(box 3).
Overall, the research suggests that there is consid-
erable scope for expanding the current UK energy
service market, particularly through the continued
development of intermediary organisations such as
public procurement frameworks that lower transaction
costs for both contractors and clients. Policy efforts to
improve building energy efficiency should therefore
consider targeted support for such intermediaries,
such as subsidising fees for public sector clients, as
this could offer substantial returns.18 However, the
high transaction costs of energy service contracting
may still constrain its use to larger organisations and
Table 4 Companies participating in UK energy service procure-
ment frameworks
Company CEF RE:FIT Essentia P-EPC
Ameresco (previously ESP) *
Bilfinger *
Bouygues * *
Breathe Energy (MCW) * * *
British Gas * *
Cofely * * *
Cynergin * *
Doosan Babcock *
EDF * *
ENER-G * *
E.On * * *
Honeywell * *
Imtech * * *
Kier *
Mitie * *
Norland *
Schneider Electrica
Skanska * *
SSE *
Veolia (previously Dalkia) *
Vital Energi *
Willmott Dixon *
CEF has procured three frameworks with a different mix of
ESCOs in each
a Schneider Electric appears in the list as it was contracted through
Ecovate to undertake an EPC at King’s College Hospital in 2013
18 The EU Energy Efficiency Directive states that ‘… Member
States or support the proper functioning of the energy services
market… by enabling independent market intermediaries to play a
role in stimulating market development on the demand and supply
side…’ (Council of the European Union 2012).
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to relatively cost-effective energy efficiency opportu-
nities. If the goal is deep retrofits of buildings,
targeting of small organisations or accelerated diffu-
sion of innovative energy-efficient technologies, addi-
tional policies and business models are likely to be
required.
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